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Market power in interactive environmental and energymarkets:
The case of Green Certificates
Abstract:
Markets for environmental externalities are typically closely related to the markets causing
such externalities, whereupon strategic interaction may result. Along these lines, the market
for Green Certificates is strongly interwoven in the electricity market as the producers of green
electricity are also the suppliers of Green Certificates. In this paper, we formulate an analytic
equilibrium model for simultaneously functioning electricity and Green Certificate markets, and
focus on the role of market power. We consider two versions of a Nash-Cournot game: a standard
Nash-Cournot game where the players treat the market for Green Certificates and the electricity
market as separate markets; and a Nash-Cournot game with endogenous treatment of the inter-
action between the electricity and Green Certificate markets with conjectured price responses.
One result is that a certificate system faced with market power may collapse into a system of per
unit subsidies, as the producers involved start to game on the joint functioning of markets.
JEL classifications: C7; Q28; Q42; Q48
Key words: renewable energy, electricity, Green Certificates, market power
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1 Introduction
Many developed economies have formulated policy to increase the share of energy supply obtained
from renewable sources relative to that from nonrenewable sources. It is, for example, a stated
European Union goal to raise the share of electricity derived from renewable sources from the
current 14% to 22% of total electricity generation by 2010 (see EU/COM (2000)).1 Similar goals
exist for the United States (see, for example, EPA (2003)). Typically, the generation of green
electricity has been stimulated through various kinds of subsidy schemes, including investment
subsidies, tax exemptions, and per unit subsidies as implemented in, for example, Denmark, Spain
and Germany. The liberalization of electricity markets has, however, induced a challenge for these
economies as the policy\measures chosen ought to be in accordance with market principles. One
idea that has been adopted as a possible alternative to direct subsidies in many countries is to
introduce markets for Green Certificates (from this point referred to as GCs). Since 1998 the
Netherlands has used a system of ”green labeling”, which is a voluntary version of the GC-system.
Denmark, Norway and Sweden2 are further examples of countries introducing markets for GCs.
In addition to EU Member States, economies like Australia, China, India and the US (see e.g.,
Giovinetto 2003) are also considering or implementing plans for GC markets.
It goes without saying that the well functioning design of GC markets is important for the
proper management of the energy sector in these economies. However, despite its apparent
popularity, it seems fair to say that the general functioning of GC markets are not yet fully
understood. For example, some problems relating to the GC market as an instrument for inducing
1Throughout this article, ’black electricty’ refers to electricity generated from nonrenewable energy sources,
while ’green electricty’ refers to that obtained from renewable sources.
2The Nordic Power Exchange, Nord Pool, launched its first product related to renewable energy production in
March 2004. The product is listed as Swedish ”elcertificate” contracts on Nord Pool’s financial market.
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new capacity for green electricity production and problems related to the GC markets acting
in concert with electricity markets and CO2 markets have been investigated by Amundsen and
Mortensen (2001, 2002), Jensen and Skytte (2002) and Bye (2003). The present paper investigates
yet another problematic feature of the GC system. The problem emerges as electricity producers
possessing market power start gaming on the joint functioning of the electricity market and the
GC market. This may result in collapse of the pricing mechanism of the GC system as GC prices
are always realized at either the stipulated upper or lower bound. Similar ideas on the exercise of
market power through interactive markets are found in papers by Kolstad and Wolak (2003) and
Chen and Hobbs (2003) concerning the joint functioning of the electricity and the NOx permit
market.3
In brief, the GC market consists of sellers and buyers of certificates. The sellers are the
producers of electricity using renewable sources. These producers are each issued a number of
tradable certificates corresponding to the amount of electricity they feed into the network. The
purchasers of certificates are consumers/distribution companies that are required by the govern-
ment to hold a certain percentage of certificates (”the percentage requirement”) corresponding
to their total consumption/end-use deliveries of electricity.4 The GCs are then seen as permits
for consuming electricity. Accordingly, this system implies that the producers using renewable
energy sources receive both the wholesale price and a tradable certificate for each kWh fed into
the electricity network. In this manner, the GC system is supposed to stimulate new investments
in green electricity generation.
3 In particular, Chen and Hobbs (2003) show that endogenous treatment of NOx- and electricity markets with
conjectured price responses may have a substantial impact on NOx permit prices, and that the price of the permits
thereby influences electricity generation.
4 Italy is an exception in this respect as the Italian system is supposed to put the purchase obligation on the
producers.
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One major implication of the GC system is that the percentage requirement functions as a
check on total electricity consumption, as the total number of certificates available is constrained
by the total capacity of renewable technologies.5 For instance, a requirement of 20 % implies
that total consumption can be no larger than five times the electricity produced from renewable
sources, unless the price of certificates tends to increase above an upper price bound specified by
the regulatory authorities. This price bound then functions as a penalty that the consumers must
pay if they do not fulfill the percentage requirement. Also, the GC system may include a lower
price bound, at which level the State guarantees to purchase any excess supply of certificates. The
percentage requirement is thus seen as a policy parameter aﬀecting the relative scarcity of green
electricity, and in this way regulating the capacity of green electricity production. However, it is
erroneous to believe that a harsher percentage requirement necessarily will result in an increased
capacity of green electricity production.6 It may or may not. In fact, in a long-run setting it may
even fall. Precise conditions for this are provided in Proposition 1.
In a competitive setting, the GC system may function as an ordinary market determining
certificate prices somewhere intermediate to the upper and lower price bounds. However, and
as mentioned, this may no longer be so in the face of market power. It then depends on how
the producers perceive the interrelationship between the electricity market and the GC market.
If the producers possessing market power in the electricity market consider the GC market as
competitive (say because the GC market is part of a larger system such that GC prices may not
be significantly aﬀected by any single agent), then market power in the electricity market may
5In many countries, windmills constitute a significant part of the green production technology. The electric-
ity production from windmills will typically vary significantly, giving rise to considerable variations in the total
production of green electricity from year to year.
6 In the Swedish system that became eﬀective as of May 1 2003, the percentage requirement is set to escalate
from the current 7 % to around 10 % in 2010.
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still result in intermediate GC prices and a well functioning pricing mechanism. However, if the
major electricity producers conjecture the impact on the GC price of their production decisions in
the electricity market and start to game on this, then the GC pricing mechanism may break down.
By withholding power delivered to the wholesale market, the electricity producer can exercise
market power by either forcing the GC price to the upper or the lower price bound (either may be
optimal for the producer) at its convenience. Basically, what is happening is that either excess
demand or excess supply of GCs is created (leading to a price at the upper price bound and
the lower price bound, respectively, with corresponding opposite eﬀects on the wholesale prices).
These results are identical irrespective of whether it is the producers of green or black electricity
(or a duopoly of the two) that possess market power: the certificate prices will be established at
either the upper or the lower bound. Thus, the GC market collapses altogether into a system
of fixed GC prices instead of endogenously determined intermediate prices. In that case the GC
system may equally well be replaced by a plain subsidy scheme for green power, with presumably
much lower transaction costs and more precise eﬀects on green power capacity construction.
The problem of interactive power and GC markets is then germane since the GC market
in many countries is related directly to the electricity market, with identical suppliers and con-
sumers to that of the electricity market. Thus, the eﬀect on the GC price of changing electricity
production can hardly be ignored by a major electricity producer knowing that the end user
price of electricity for a large part is composed of the wholesale price and a fraction (e.g., 20%)
of the GC price. Put diﬀerently, the marginal revenue of a major producer of green electricity
stems from both markets (i.e., the electricity wholesale price and the certificate price), and the
marginal reduction of green electricity production influences both markets (i.e., a reduction of
the supply of electricity and a reduction of the supply of GCs). However, a major producer
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of black electricity knows (even though she may not be directly involved in GC trade) that a
marginal reduction of the electricity supply will lead to a higher end-user electricity price, hence
reduced total consumption, and therefore a reduced demand for GCs. Given that market power
in electricity generation is likely to exist in many economies, the possible malfunctioning of the
pricing mechanism should thus be given serious consideration in the discussions and development
of alternative GC systems.7
In the following paper, we formulate an analytic equilibrium model for a GC system and con-
sider three main cases: perfect competition in both the electricity market and the GC market,
market power in both markets using standard Cournot assumptions, and market power in both
markets with endogenous treatment of the interaction between the electricity and GC markets
with conjectured price responses. We also report results on various other market forms, i.e.,
separate market power in the generation of black electricity, separate market power in the gener-
ation of green electricity, and market power in the joint generation of green and black electricity.
Throughout the paper we assume Nash-Cournot (NC-) behavior.8 The first section of the paper
presents the model. The next sections present and analyze the equilibrium solutions for the cases
listed above. The final section summarizes and concludes.
2 The model
The following model is designed to capture a long-run situation for the simultaneous functioning
electricity market and a market for GCs.9 We will use the following list of variables:
7 In Denmark, for example, the production of green electricity (i.e., notably from windmills) is very concentrated:
in the Jutland-Fuen price area of Nord Pool a single producer is currently active.
8Alternative models of describing behavior in the electricity market exist in the form of Bertrand games, supply
function games and auction games, amongst others). For a discussion of why NC-behavior is a reasonable model
in this regard, see Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) and Borenstein, Bushnell and Knittel (1999).
9For a short-run version of the model, see Amundsen and Mortensen (2001).
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p = consumer price of electricity
s = price of GCs
s = upper price bound of GCs
s = lower price bound of GCs
q = wholesale price of electricity
x = total consumption of electricity
y = generation of black electricity
z = generation of green electricity
α = percentage requirement of green electricity consumption
gd = demand for GCs
The inverse demand function is assumed given by:
p (x) , with ∂p(x)∂x = p
0 < 0.
The cost function for the producers of black electricity is assumed given by:
c = c (y) , with c
0
(y) > 0 and c
00
(y) > 0.
The rationale for choosing an increasing long-run marginal cost function for this industry is
that the expansion of output may drive up the price of CO2-emission permits or CO2-taxes to
comply with national CO2-emission constraints. The cost function for the producers of green
electricity is assumed given by:
h (z) , with h0 (z) > 0 and h00 (z) > 0.
The rationale for choosing an increasing long-run marginal cost function for this industry, is
that good sites for generation technologies such as wind-mills may be in scarce supply.
The two groups of producers deliver electricity to a common wholesale market, from where
profit maximizing distribution companies purchase electricity for end-use deliveries.
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In the model we have two markets, one market for electricity and one market for GCs. We
will apply the subscripts c and m to the endogenous variables in order to indicate whether the
markets are competitive, or if there is market power involved in one or both of the generation
technologies. The first subscript refers to the market structure among the producers of black
electricity, while the second describes the market structure for green electricity. In addition, we
use the subscriptM for the case where we consider market power in the joint generation of black
and green electricity.
3 Perfect competition
For the case of perfect competition in both markets, the profit maximizing market participants
are price takers. The producers of black electricity act as if they jointly maximize10:
Π (y) = qy − c (y).
The first order condition for an optimum in the competitive market is:
q∗ = c0 (y).
For each unit of green electricity generated one certificate will be issued. The producers of
green electricity will sell all their certificates and will thus earn the wholesale price plus the GC
price per unit of electricity they generate.11 Jointly they act as to maximize:
Π (z) = [q + s] z − h (z).
The first order condition is:
q + s = h
0
(z).
For each unit of electricity bought and sold to the end users the distribution companies will
10To simplify the presentation we suppress subscripts whenever confusion may be avoided.
11Given the assumption of perfect competition in the generation of green electricity, it is obvious that the
generators will always sell all their certificates. However, and as shown later, market power in the generation of
green electricity makes it relevant for these generators to consider whether they can utilize their market power to
aﬀect the price of GCs in order to increase their profit from the GC and the electricity market.
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have to pay the wholesale price plus a proportion α of the certificate price in accordance with
the percentage requirement. The distribution companies are throughout assumed not to enjoy
any market power. Hence, jointly they act as to maximize:
Π (x) = px− [q + αs]x.
The first order condition is:
p = q + αs.
In the market for GCs the demand is given by:
gd = αx.
3.1 cc-equilibrium
The consumption of electricity, and its composition of green and black electricity, in equilibrium,
vary according to whether the price of GCs in equilibrium, s∗, is within the specified price interval,
i.e., s < s∗ < s, or on either the upper or lower price bound. If the price of GCs is within the
interval, the percentage requirement is fulfilled and total consumption of electricity is given by
x = z
∗
α (the ”allowable” consumption). If the price of GCs is at the lower bound, i.e., s
∗ = s, the
demand for GCs is less than z∗, and the excess supply of GCs is bought by the State. In this
case the percentage requirement is more than fulfilled. If the price of GCs in equilibrium is equal
to the upper price bound, s, the demand for certificates exceeds the maximum possible supply.
In this case, the consumers are allowed to buy more black electricity if they pay a ”fine” equal to
s per unit of extra electricity consumption. Denoting the aggregate marginal cost functions by
c
0
(y∗cc) and h
0
(z∗cc), the equilibrium conditions under perfect competition are12:
p (x∗cc) = q∗cc+αs∗cc (1)
12 In equation (2), <, = and > refer to the cases s∗cc = s, s < s
∗
cc < s and s
∗
cc = s, respectively.
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x∗cc = y∗cc+z∗cc S z
∗
cc
α (2)
q∗cc+s∗cc = h
0
(z∗cc) (3)
q∗cc = c
0
(y∗cc) (4)
The cc-equilibrium solution is illustrated for the case of s < s∗cc < s in Figure 1. The quantity
constraint implied by the percentage requirement is seen to drive a wedge equal to αs∗cc between
the electricity price and the marginal cost of electricity generation. The system thus involves a
transfer of consumer and producer surplus from black electricity generation to a subsidy of green
electricity generation.
Figure 1 here
3.2 Analysis
In the proposed GC systems, the percentage requirement is perceived as a policy instrument
aﬀecting the level of green electricity in end-use consumption. Unlike price fixation (with quan-
tity as an endogenous variable) or quantity fixation (with price as an endogenous variable) the
percentage requirement neither fixes price nor quantity, and both variables are endogenously
determined. The following proposition shows that in general it is not true that an increase of
the percentage requirement leads to an increased generation of green electricity in equilibrium.
It does, however, lead to a reduced generation of black electricity, and therefore - from (4)- a
reduced wholesale price of electricity. As the eﬀect on green electricity is indeterminate, the eﬀect
on total consumption and end-user price is also indeterminate.13
13This is a generalization of results obtained in Amundsen and Mortensen (2001, 2002). Note that the GC system
specifies the share and not the absolute amount of green electricity in end-use consumption. Hence, if the eﬀect
on end-use consumption of electricity of an increase of α is negative, the percentage requirement may be fulfilled
even if the generation of green electricity is reduced. See Jensen and Skytte (2002) and Bye (2003), who obtain
more structure on the results by applying specific functions on broadly similar models.
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Proposition 1 Under perfect competition in the electricity and the certificate markets, the per-
centage requirement, α, has the following eﬀects: i) if s < s∗cc < s, then
dy∗cc
dα < 0 while sign
³
dz∗cc
dα
´
and sign
³
dx∗cc
dα
´
are indeterminate, and ii) if s∗cc = s or s∗cc = s, then
dz∗cc
dα < 0,
dy∗cc
dα < 0,
dx∗cc
dα < 0.
Proof. See appendix A.
4 Market power in a standard Cournot setting
As argued in the introduction, there are reasons to believe that market power may exist both
among the producers of black electricity and among the producers of green electricity. In the
following, we approach market power from two diﬀerent angles. First, we use a standard Cournot
framework. In this setting the certificate price is treated as exogenous by both the producers of
black and green electricity, i.e., neither of the producers realize that their quantity decisions in
the electricity market aﬀect the GC price and thereby the resulting wholesale price of electricity
through the interaction between the electricity and the certificate market. In the next section we
focus on the interaction between the electricity market and the GC market and make the more
realistic assumption that each player may conjecture the eﬀects on both markets of decisions
made in one market. We thus include in our model an endogenous treatment of the interaction
between the electricity and the GC market.
Starting with the traditional Cournot setting, we assume a duopolistic market structure, i.e.,
there is market power in both generation technologies such that both the producers of black
and green electricity act as NC-playing oligopolists. The producers of black electricity consider
then both the quantity of green electricity and the number of GCs (represented by z) as given.
The producers of green electricity consider the quantity of black electricity (represented by y)
as given. In addition, the traditional Cournot framework implies that the GC price will also be
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considered as given (represented by bs). In the NC-equilibrium none of the producers will want
to change their quantity decision.
The NC-playing producers of black electricity are faced with the following residual demand
function for wholesale electricity:
q = q (x) = p (x)− αbs, where x = y + z,
and the following optimization problem:
MaxΠ (y, z) = q (x) y − c (y).
In equilibrium the profit maximizing oligopolistic generator of black electricity will therefore
equate marginal revenue with marginal cost:
∂Π
∂y =
∂q(x)
∂y y + q − c
0
(y) = 0.
Or more precisely:
∂Π
∂y =
∂p
∂xy + q − c
0
(y) = 0.
The producer of green electricity maximizes:
Π (z, y) = (q + bs) z − h (z).
Resulting in the following first order condition:
∂Π
∂z =
∂p
∂xz + q + bs− h0 (z) = 0.
4.1 mm-equilibrium
Using mm as the subscript for the case of market power in the traditional Cournot setting, we
then have the following equilibrium solution for the key variables14:
p (x∗mm) = q∗mm + αs∗mm (5)
x∗mm = y∗mm + z∗mm S z
∗
mm
α (6)
14Again, <, = and > in equation (14) refer to the cases s∗mm = s, s < s
∗
mm < s and s
∗
mm = s, respectively.
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∂p(x∗mm)
∂x z
∗
mm + q
∗
mm + s
∗
mm = h
0
(z∗mm) (7)
∂p(x∗mm)
∂x y
∗
mm + q
∗
mm = c
0
(y∗mm) (8)
4.2 Analysis
The results of the analysis are highlighted in Propositions 2 and 3.
Proposition 2 Under duopoly with standard Cournot assumptions, the percentage requirement,
α, has the following eﬀects: i) if s < s∗mm < s, then
dy∗mm
dα < 0 (given p
00 (x∗mm) ≤ 0), while
sign
³
dz∗mm
dα
´
sign
³
dx∗mm
dα
´
are indeterminate and ii) if s∗mm = s or s∗mm = s and p00 (x∗mm) < 0,
then dz
∗
mm
dα < 0,
dy∗mm
dα < 0,
dx∗mm
dα < 0.
Proof. See appendix B.
These eﬀects are thus similar to the corresponding eﬀects under perfect competition, i.e., the
eﬀect of a percentage increase of α on black electricity is negative, while the eﬀects on green
electricity and total consumption are indeterminate.
Proposition 3 Under duopoly with standard Cournot assumptions, we have that: i) if s < s∗cc <
s and s < s∗mm < s then z∗mm < z∗cc, y∗mm < y∗cc, and x∗mm < x∗cc.
Proof. See appendix C.
The eﬀect of market power on the produced quantities are thus as expected.
5 Market power in interactive electricity and GC markets
We now take into account the interaction between the electricity and the GC markets. This
framework seems to us as a more realistic representation of the functioning of the electricity mar-
ket in combination with an environmental market than the traditional Cournot setting specified
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in the preceding section. In particular, this appears to be the case for the GC market as this
market is exclusively connected to the electricity market. The markets are thus in a sense com-
plementary to each other. It seems unrealistic that the producers of electricity should neglect the
obvious eﬀects that their quantity decisions have on the price of GCs, and the interaction between
the GC price and the wholesale price of electricity. Other environmental markets, such as, for
example, markets for CO2 emission quotas, may be linked to a number of diﬀerent markets where
the polluting activity occurs, e.g., electricity generation, industry production of diﬀerent kinds,
transportation, etc. In such cases one could perhaps argue more convincingly for the traditional
Cournot setting in which the price in the environmental market is taken as given.
The optimization problems for the producers of black and green electricity in this case are
identical to the corresponding problems in the preceding mm-case, except for the fact that the
GC price is now a function of total quantity, i.e., we have s = s (x). In their quantity decision
the producers will therefore also consider the eﬀect their decision has on the GC price, because
they realize that this price aﬀects the wholesale price of electricity (q = p− αs).
The NC-playing producers of black electricity are faced with the following residual demand
function for wholesale electricity:
q = q (x) = p (x)− αs (x), where x = y + z,
and the following optimization problem:
MaxΠ (y, z) = q (x) y − c (y).
In equilibrium, the profit maximizing oligopolistic generator of black electricity will therefore
equate marginal revenue with marginal cost:
∂Π
∂y =
∂q(x)
∂y y + q − c
0
(y) = 0.
Or more precisely:
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∂Π
∂y =
h
∂p
∂x − α ∂s∂y
i
y + q − c0 (y) = 0.
Correspondingly, we find the first order condition for the oligopolistic producer of green
electricity to be15:
∂Π
∂z =
h
∂p
∂x + (1− α) ∂s∂z
i
z + q + s− h0 (z) = 0.
Observe that a marginal change in the generation of electricity, both black and green, may
aﬀect the wholesale price through both the electricity market and the GC market. The eﬀect
through the electricity market stems from an ordinary eﬀect on consumer prices, while the eﬀect
through the GC market stems from a change induced by the demand/supply of certificates (e.g.,
an increase in the generation of black electricity by one unit will, in equilibrium, imply an
increased consumption of electricity by one unit and increased demand for certificates by α
units. Correspondingly, an increase in the generation of green electricity by one unit will also
increase the supply of GCs by one unit). Furthermore, observe that the demand for GCs is a
derived demand equal to a given percentage of the demand for electricity. Thus, the demand for
GCs is a function of the total electricity price and not the GC price. As recognized above, in (1),
the electricity price is equal to the sum of the wholesale price and the GC price multiplied by the
percentage requirement. It is important to note that the producers of electricity can aﬀect the
”composition” of the electricity price; for example, raise the wholesale price and lower the GC
price through their production decisions.
The possibility of aﬀecting the GC price depends, however, on whether the GC price is either
at the upper and lower price bounds or between the upper and lower price bounds. If the GC price
is at either of the price bounds, the eﬀect on the GC price of a marginal change of the generation
15Following a similar line of reasoning as in the preceding case it can be shown that the producers of green
electricity will never hold back certificates from the market.
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of black or green electricity
³
∂s
∂y or
∂s
∂z
´
is equal to zero. In these cases the wholesale price can
only be aﬀected through the electricity market (i.e., an ordinary price eﬀect). If, however, the GC
price is between the price bounds, the producers can also influence the wholesale price through
the GC market. For this case, the marginal eﬀect on the GC price
³
∂s
∂y and
∂s
∂z
´
is not defined
as the marginal revenue is discontinuous at this point. Accordingly, under N-C assumptions, the
producers of black electricity can induce a reduction in demand for GCs and thus create an excess
supply of GCs by marginally reducing the generation of black electricity. A consequence is a drop
of the GC price to its lower bound and a corresponding upward jump of the wholesale price. The
composition of the electricity price is thus changed to the benefit of producers of black electricity.
Producers of green electricity may also use their market power to reduce their generation of green
electricity marginally and thus create an excess demand for GCs. This leads to a jump of the
GC price to its upper bound and a corresponding reduction of the wholesale price.
5.1 MM-equilibrium
The subscript MM is used to identify the case of market power in interactive electricity and
power markets. We then have the following equilibrium solution for the key variables16:
p (x∗MM) = q
∗
MM+αs
∗
MM (9)
x∗MM = y
∗
MM+z
∗
MM S
z∗MM
α (10)·
∂p(x∗MM)
∂x + (1− α)
∂s(x∗MM)
∂z
¸
z∗MM+q
∗
MM+s
∗
MM = h
0
(z∗MM) (11)·
∂p(x∗MM)
∂x − α
∂s(x∗MM)
∂y
¸
y∗MM+q
∗
MM = c
0
(y∗MM) (12)
16Again, <, = and > in equation (14) refer to the cases s∗MM = s, s < s
∗
MM < s and s
∗
MM = s, respectively.
For the cases of s∗MM = s and s
∗
MM = s, we have
∂s(x∗MM)
∂z
=
∂s(x∗MM)
∂y
= 0. Thus, (15) and (16) are reduced to
∂p(x∗MM)
∂x
z∗MM + q
∗
MM + s
∗
MM = h
0
(z∗MM) and
∂p(x∗MM)
∂x
y∗MM + q
∗
MM = c
0
(y∗MM ), respectively.
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5.2 Analysis
The results of the analysis are highlighted in Propositions 4 and 5. Proposition 4 shows that
the certificate market collapses in the sense that the GC price will never be established at an
intermediate level. It may, however, be established at the lower or upper price bound.17
Proposition 4 Assume that both the producers of black and green electricity act as NC-playing
oligopolists in interactive electricity and GC markets, then - in equilibrium - there will i) never
be established an intermediate certificate price such that s < s∗MM < s, but ii) there may be an
equilibrium certificate price at the lower or the upper price bound, i.e. s∗MM = s or s
∗
MM = s.
Proof. See appendix D.
In Figure 2 and 3 we illustrate the profit curves of the NC-playing producers of black and
green electricity, respectively. The figures are based on a simple numerical model satisfying the
assumptions of the model, see Appendix E. The profit curve of the NC-playing producers of black
electricity is generated assuming that they consider both the quantity of green electricity and
the number of GCs as given. Fixing the quantity of green electricity at the equilibrium level, we
construct the profit curve for diﬀerent quantities of black electricity. Under Cournot behavioral
assumptions, oligopolistic producers of black electricity choose the quantity of black electricity
that maximizes profit. The equilibrium quantity of black electricity is then found where the
profit curve is at its maximum. The profit curve representing the producers of green electricity
are generated analogously, i.e., assuming that these producers consider the quantity of black
electricity as given.
17Observe also that the producers of green electricity will always sell all certificates generated. The proof is not
included in the paper, but may be obtained from the authors upon request.
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In particular, we observe the discontinuity of the profit curves. Looking first at Figure 2 we
note that the profit of the producers of black electricity drops (discontinuously) at a specific value
of y. This is the quantity of black electricity at which total consumption of electricity is at the
allowable consumption level. For lower production levels of black electricity, there is an excess
supply of GCs, i.e., the GC price is at the lower price bound. For higher production levels of black
electricity, where total consumption is above the allowable consumption level, the GC price jumps
to the upper price bound. Figure 2 thus illustrates an equilibrium solution with a GC price at the
upper price bound. In Figure 3 we observe a similar shape in the profit curve of the producers
of green electricity, i.e., the profit curve drops (discontinuously) at the point of the allowable
consumption level. As opposed to the figure representing the profit curve of the producers of
black electricity, quantity levels of green electricity below the allowable consumption level will
generate a GC price at the upper price bound. For these low quantities of green electricity, there
will be an excess demand for GCs. For higher quantities of green electricity, the GC price is at
the lower bound. Figure 3 illustrates an equilibrium GC price at the upper price bound.
Another interesting point is that it is not necessarily the case that the producers of black
electricity will always prefer a GC price at the lower price bound and the producers of green
electricity prefer a GC price at the upper bound. This is illustrated by Figure 2, where the
oligopolistic producers of black electricity somewhat counterintuitivly maximize profit at a GC
price at the upper price bound. Correspondingly, it can also be shown that the oligopolistic
producers of green electricity in some cases would actually prefer a GC price at the lower price
bound.
Figure 2 and 3 here
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Proposition 5 verifies - as is to be expected - that market power in interactive markets leads
to less total electricity generation as compared with perfect competition. Nevertheless, even
though the GC system collapses under interactive market power, as shown by Proposition 4, the
generation of green electricity in fact may be larger than it would be under perfect competition
and therefore also - from Proposition 3 - what it would be under the standard NC-assumptions.
However, the same may also be true for black electricity.
Proposition 5 Under the assumptions of oligopolistic NC-playing producers of black and green
electricity in interactive electricity and GC markets we have that i) x∗MM < x
∗
cc and that ii)
sign (y∗MM − y∗cc) and sign (z∗MM − z∗cc) are both indeterminate, irrespective of whether s < s∗cc <
s, s∗cc = s or s∗cc = s.
Proof. See appendix F.
In Figure 4 we have illustrated a number of diﬀerent equilibrium solutions for diﬀerent values
of the percentage requirement, α. The figure is based on the numerical model specified in appendix
E. The figure illustrates that the quantity of green electricity under interactive market power,
z∗MM , may be larger than under perfect competition, z
∗
cc. We observe also from the figure that
the quantity of black electricity in the interactive market power case, y∗MM , exceeds the quantity
of green electricity, i.e. we have y∗MM > z
∗
MM , which was shown in the proof of Proposition 5 to
be a necessary condition for z∗MM > z
∗
cc.
Figure 4 here
6 Summary and concluding remarks
This paper examines the impact of market power in a system of Green Certificates (GCs). The
results are summarized in Propositions 1-5. One of the main insights from the paper is that the
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eﬀect of market power on the GC system to a large extent depends on whether a traditional
analysis using the standard Cournot framework is followed, or, and this is argued to be the more
realistic case, producers are allowed to game on the interactive functioning of the electricity
and GC markets. Under standard Cournot assumptions, the eﬀect of market power on market
prices and quantities are shown to be as expected using standard economic reasoning. However,
by taking the interaction between the two markets into consideration, the results are altered
significantly. Based on our analysis of market power in interactive electricity and GC markets,
it seems fair to conclude that market power in most cases will prevent the realization of market-
based GC price within the specified price interval. Thus, the GC system will most likely reduce to
a system corresponding to direct subsidies financed through consumer/producer taxes. It is also
shown that market power could aﬀect the produced quantities of black and green electricity in
unexpected ways as compared with the case of perfect competition. A third result is the uncertain
impact of using the percentage requirement as a policy instrument to aﬀect the generation of green
electricity. This result applied both under perfect competition and under market power.
In the paper, we have assumed that both the producers of black and green electricity enjoy
market power. An identical analysis assuming market power among only one of the generation
technologies, i.e., either black or green, produced corresponding results with regard to the equi-
librium GC price; the GC price will always be at one of the price bounds. The only case in which
a market-based equilibrium GC price is obtained is when it is assumed that a single monopolistic
producer could generate electricity from both renewable and nonrenewable sources.18
This paper also points to the increasing popularity of GC markets around the world. However,
18The proofs of these results are omitted from the text in the interests of brevity. Details of the analysis and
proofs may be obtained from the authors upon request.
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considering that the existence of some form of market power is not unlikely, and given the
possibility of high administrative costs associated with a GC system, the problems revealed in
this paper should be given serious attention. Put diﬀerently, it is unlikely to be cost eﬃcient to
introduce a GC system that ultimately functions like an ordinary subsidy scheme.
Another problematic feature of the GC system is that the percentage requirement in itself is
not a policy instrument that determines the capacity level of green electricity generation (con-
versely to how it is commonly perceived). An increase of the percentage requirement may, in
fact, lead to a reduction of remuneration through investing in new capacity for green electricity
(though it will aﬀect the composition of black and green electricity generation in the preferred
direction).19 Along with other potential problems (e.g., compatibility with CO2-emission permits
systems and strong price volatility of GCs based on wind power) the problems revealed in this
paper clearly call for caution in the design and implementation of GC systems.
Empirically, experiences from GC systems actually implemented are so far limited. However,
some interesting observations from the Swedish GC system may be noted. The Swedish system
has been operational since May 2003. So far, the trade statistics show that GCs frequently have
been traded at the specified upper GC price bound.20 According to our paper, one reason for this
could be market power on the supply side. Another possible explanation may be that the Swedish
GCs have an unlimited durability. The upper GC price bound of the Swedish system increased
from SEK 175 to SEK 240 from 2003 to 2004. This may cause market participants, consumers
and producers of GCs, expecting increasing GC prices in the future, to choose to save their GCs
19Also, the GC systems currently running or planned do not distinguishbetween the degree of ”greenness” or
”blackness”. This is contrary to what a system of permits for CO2-emissions does.
20Trade statistics of the Swedish GC system may be obtained from the Swedish Energy Agency,
http://www.stem.se/.
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and instead pay the penalty price (consumers), or save the GCs for later sale (producers).
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. i) For s < s∗cc < s, inserting (3) and (4) into (1) yields the electricity price as a linear
combination of marginal costs of the two groups of generation technologies in equilibrium, i.e.
p (x∗cc) = (1− α) c0 (y∗cc) + αh0 (z∗cc). Take the implicit derivatives of this expression with respect
to α and arrive at: dz
∗
cc
dα =
αs∗cc+x∗cc
h
(∂p/∂x)−(1−α)c00 (y∗cc)
i
D ,
dy∗cc
dα =
(1−α)s∗cc+x∗cc
h
αh
00
(z∗cc)−(∂p/∂x)
i
D , and
dx∗cc
dα =
s∗cc+x∗cc
h
αh
00
(z∗cc)−(1−α)c
00
(y∗cc)
i
D , with D =
h
∂p
∂x − (1− α)2 c
00
(y∗cc)− α2h00 (z∗cc)
i
< 0. Inspec-
tion of signs verifies the above claims.
ii) For s∗cc = s or s∗cc = s, insert (4) in (3). Take the implicit derivative with respect
to α and get h
00
(z∗cc)
dz∗cc
dα = c
00
(y∗cc)
dy∗cc
dα . As marginal costs are assumed increasing it follows:
signdz
∗
cc
dα = sign
dy∗cc
dα = sign
dx∗cc
dα . The last equality follows as
dx∗cc
dα =
dz∗cc
dα +
dy∗cc
dα . But the signs
cannot be non-negative. To see this insert (4) in (1) and take the implicit derivative with respect
to α to obtain ∂p∂x
dx∗cc
dα = c
00
(y∗cc)
dy∗cc
dα + es, where es = s or s. As ∂p∂x < 0 we must have dx∗ccdα < 0
for this equation to hold. Hence, signdz
∗
cc
dα = sign
dy∗cc
dα = sign
dx∗cc
dα < 0 for this case.
B Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. i) For s < s∗mm < s, inserting (7) and (8) into (1) yields the electricity price as a linear
combination of marginal costs of the two groups of generation technologies in equilibrium, i.e.
p (x∗mm) = (1− α)
h
c
0
(y∗mm)− ∂p∂xy∗mm
i
+ α
h
h
0
(z∗mm)− ∂p∂xz∗mm
i
. Take the implicit derivatives of
this expression with respect to α and arrive at:
dz∗mm
dα =
x∗mm
h
p0(x∗mm)+(1−α)p0(x∗mm)+(1−α)p00(x∗mm)y∗mm−αp00(x∗mm)z∗mm−(1−α)c
00
(y∗mm)
i
F +
α[p0(x∗mm)y∗mm−c0(y∗mm)+h0(z∗mm)−p0(x∗mm)z∗mm]
F ,
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dy∗mm
dα =
αq∗mm+s∗mm+x∗mm
h
αh
00
(z∗mm)−(1−α)p0(x∗mm)−αp00(x∗mm)z∗mm
i
−p00(x)y∗mm
F , and
dx∗cc
dα =
x∗mm[(1−α)p0(x∗mm)−(1−α)c00(y∗mm)+αh00(z∗mm)−αp0(x∗mm)]
F −
p0(x∗mm)y∗mm−p0(x∗mm)z∗mm−c0(y∗mm)+h0(z∗mm)
F , with
F =
p0 (x∗mm)− (1− α)2 c
00
(y∗mm)− α2h00 (z∗mm) + (1− α) p00 (x∗mm) y∗mm
+ (1− α)2 p0 (x∗mm) + αp00 (x∗mm) z∗mm + α2p0 (x∗mm)
 < 0,
given p00 (x∗mm) ≤ 0. Inspection of signs verifies the above claims, given p00 (x∗mm) ≤ 0.
ii) For s∗mm = s or s∗mm = s, insert (8) in (7). Take the implicit derivative with respect to α
and get h
00
(z∗mm)
dz∗cc
dα = c
00
(y∗mm)
dy∗mm
dα +p
0 (x∗mm)
h
∂z∗mm
∂α − ∂y
∗
mm
∂α
i
+p00 (x∗mm)
∂x∗mm
∂α [z
∗
mm − y∗mm].
Assume first linear demand, i.e. p00 (x∗mm), then as marginal costs are assumed increasing it
follows: signdz
∗
mm
dα = sign
dy∗mm
dα = sign
dx∗mm
dα . The last equality follows as
dx∗mm
dα =
dz∗mm
dα +
dy∗mm
dα .
But the signs cannot be non-negative. To see this insert (8) in (5) and take the implicit derivative
with respect to α to obtain p0 (x∗mm)
h
dx∗mm
dα − dy
∗
mm
dα
i
= c
00
(y∗cc)
dy∗mm
dα + es, where es = s or s. As
p0 (x) < 0 we must have dx
∗
mm
dα < 0 for this equation to hold. Hence, sign
dz∗mm
dα = sign
dy∗mm
dα =
signdx
∗
mm
dα < 0 for this case.
C Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. To obtain a contradiction assume z∗mm ≥ z∗cc. As z∗mm = α1−αy∗mm = αx∗mm (from (6)) and
z∗cc = α1−αy
∗
cc = αx
∗
cc (from (2)); we see that z
∗
mm ≥ z∗cc implies y∗mm ≥ y∗cc and x∗mm ≥ x∗cc. Hence,
we must have p (x∗mm) ≤ p (x∗cc). Next, from (8) and (4) we have q∗mm = c0 (y∗mm)− p0 (x∗mm) y∗mm
and q∗cc = c0 (y∗cc). As z∗mm ≥ z∗cc implies y∗mm ≥ y∗cc we must have q∗mm > q∗cc. Next, by successive
substitutions from the two sets of first order conditions we arrive at p (x∗mm) = (1− α) q∗mm +
α [h0 (z∗mm)− p0 (x∗mm) z∗mm] and p (x∗cc) = (1− α) q∗cc+α [h0 (z∗mm)]. As q∗mm > q∗cc and z∗mm > z∗cc,
we are forced to conclude that p (x∗mm) > p (x∗cc). This contradicts the above conclusion that
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p (x∗mm) ≤ p (x∗cc). Hence, we must have z∗mm < z∗cc and y∗mm < y∗cc.
D Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. This proof consists of two parts. i) Assume first that we look at the quantity decision from
the point of view of the producers of black electricity. To show that we cannot have s < s∗mm < s,
assume yˆ is a solution satisfying the first order conditions for the producers of black electricity and
that yˆ+z = zα where z is the quantity of green electricity that the producers of black electricity, in
accordance with the NC-assumption, consider as given. Clearly, if y < yˆ, then s∗mm = s, due to
excess supply of certificates (i.e. z > α (y + z)) and if y > yˆ, then s∗mm = s, due to excess demand
for certificates. Denote the marginal revenue function, g (y, z), by g (y, z) = ∂q∂yy + q. Observe
that g (y, z) = ∂p∂xy + q for y 6= yˆ as ∂s∂y = 0 for such values. Clearly, g (y, z) is discontinuous at
yˆ as lim
y→yˆ−
g (y, z) = ∂p∂x yˆ + qˆ
− and lim
y→yˆ+
g (y, z) = ∂p∂x yˆ + qˆ
+ where qˆ− = lim
y→yˆ−
q = p (yˆ + z)− αs
and qˆ+ = lim
y→yˆ+
q = p (yˆ + z) − αs. However, as Π (yˆ, z) = qyˆ − c (yˆ), profit maximization will
lead the producers of black electricity to secure qˆ− (by an infinitesimal quantity reduction of black
electricity) implying the corner solution, i.e. s∗mm = s. An example is illustrated in Figure 2.
ii) Then we focus on the problem from the point of view of the producers of green electricity.
To show that we cannot have s < s∗mm < s, assume zˆ and wˆ, with wˆ ≤ zˆ, satisfy the optimality
conditions for the producers of green electricity and that y + zˆ = wˆα where y is the quantity of
black electricity that the producers of green electricity, in accordance with the NC-assumption,
consider as given. We consider two cases: a) wˆ < zˆ and b) wˆ = zˆ.
a) Clearly, if z < zˆ (for given values of y and wˆ) then s∗mm = s, due to excess supply of
certificates (i.e. wˆ > α (y + z)) and if z > zˆ, then s∗mm = s, due to excess demand for certificates.
Denote the marginal revenue function, g (z, y, wˆ), by g (z, y, wˆ) = ∂q∂z z +
∂s
∂z wˆ + q. Observe that
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g (z, y, wˆ) = ∂p∂xz+q for z 6= zˆ as ∂s∂z = 0 for such values. Clearly, g (z, y, wˆ) is discontinuous at zˆ
as lim
z→zˆ−
g (z, y, wˆ) = ∂p∂x zˆ+ qˆ
− and lim
z→zˆ+
g (z, y, wˆ) = ∂p∂x zˆ+ qˆ
+ where qˆ− = lim
z→ˆz−
q = p (y + zˆ)−αs
and qˆ+ = lim
z→ˆz+
q = p (y + zˆ)− αs. The profit function is Π (zˆ, y, wˆ) = qzˆ + swˆ − h (zˆ). Rewrite
this as Π (zˆ, y, wˆ) = p (y + zˆ) zˆ+s (wˆ− αzˆ)−h (zˆ) and observe that the assumption of y+ zˆ = wˆα
implies wˆ > αzˆ. Hence, profit maximization will lead the producers of green electricity to secure
qˆ+ (by an infinitesimal quantity increase of green electricity) implying the corner solution s∗mm =
s. An example is illustrated in figure 3.
E Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. i) To obtain a contradiction, assume that x∗MM ≥ x∗cc, then we must have either y∗MM ≥
y∗cc or z∗MM ≥ z∗cc or both y∗MM ≥ y∗cc and z∗MM ≥ z∗cc. Assume y∗MM ≥ y∗cc, then q∗MM =
c0 (y∗MM)− ∂p∂xy∗MM > c0 (y∗cc) = q∗cc. Consider the case of s∗MM = s and s ≤ s∗MM ≤ s and the case
of s∗MM = s and s
∗
cc = s. From (1) and (9) we have p (x
∗
MM) = q
∗
MM+αs
∗
MM > q
∗
cc+αs
∗
cc = p (x
∗
cc).
Hence, x∗MM < x
∗
cc. This contradicts the assumption that x
∗
MM ≥ x∗cc. It remains to consider
the case of s∗MM = s and s
∗
cc > s. As s
∗
MM = s we know that z
∗
MM > αx
∗
MM and as s
∗
cc > s we
know that z∗cc > αx∗cc. Under the assumption that x∗MM ≥ x∗cc we must thus have z∗MM ≥ z∗cc.
From (3) and (11) we then have q∗MM + s > q
∗
MM +
∂p
∂xz
∗
MM + s = h
0 (z∗MM) > h
0 (z∗cc) = q∗cc+ s∗cc.
Furthermore, we have q∗MM −q∗cc > s∗cc−s > αs∗cc−αs > 0. Hence, we must also have p (x∗MM) =
q∗MM + αs > q
∗
cc + αs
∗
cc = p (x
∗
cc). Consequently, x
∗
MM < x
∗
cc, which contradicts the assumption
that x∗MM ≥ x∗cc. Hence, we must have x∗MM < x∗cc. Alternatively we may reach the same
conclusion starting with the assumption that z∗MM ≥ z∗cc.
ii) However, we may have y∗MM ≥ y∗cc or z∗MM ≥ z∗cc provided that z∗MM is suﬃciently smaller
than z∗cc, or y∗MM is suﬃciently smaller than y
∗
cc, such that x
∗
MM < x
∗
cc is still satisfied.
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a) Consider first a suﬃcient condition for z∗MM ≥ z∗cc: from (3) and (7) we see that if q∗MM +
∂p
∂xz
∗
MM +s
∗
MM ≥ q∗cc+s∗cc then h0 (z∗MM) ≥ h0 (z∗cc) so that z∗MM ≥ z∗cc. Substituting from (4) and
(8) we have c0 (y∗MM)+
∂p
∂x (z
∗
MM − y∗MM)+s∗MM ≥ c0 (y∗cc)+s∗cc. From i) we have that z∗MM ≥ z∗cc
implies y∗MM < y
∗
cc. Thus,
∂p
∂x (z
∗
MM − y∗MM)+ s∗MM − s∗cc ≥ c0 (y∗cc)− c0 (y∗MM) ≥ 0. For the cases
of s∗cc ≥ s∗MM , we see that this condition necessitates y∗MM > z∗MM . If c00 (y) = 0 and s∗cc ≥ s∗MM
then y∗MM > z
∗
MM , i.e. black electricity has more than 50% of the market, is alone a suﬃcient
condition for z∗MM ≥ z∗cc.
b) Next, consider a suﬃcient condition for y∗MM ≥ y∗cc. From (4) and (8) we see that if
q∗MM +
∂p
∂xy
∗
MM ≥ q∗cc then c0 (y∗MM) ≥ c0 (y∗cc) so that y∗MM ≥ y∗cc. Substituting from (3) and
(7), rearranging terms and recognizing from i) that y∗MM ≥ y∗cc implies z∗MM < z∗cc we get
∂p
∂x (y
∗
MM − z∗MM) + s∗cc − s∗MM ≥ h0 (z∗cc) − h0 (z∗MM) ≥ 0. For cases of s∗MM ≥ s∗cc we see that
this condition necessitates z∗MM ≥ z∗cc. If h00 (z) = 0 and s∗MM ≥ s∗cc then z∗MM ≥ y∗MM , i.e. green
electricity has more than 50% of the market, is alone a suﬃcient condition for y∗MM > y
∗
cc.
F A numerical model
In this appendix we will present a simple numerical model satisfying the assumptions we have
made about the electricity market. The model is used to provide proofs for the existence of some
of the results referred to in the propositions in this article. It is also applied for the calculations
of the numerical examples illustrated by Figures 2-7.
We assume the following functions:
The inverse demand function is given by:
p (x) = a− bx,with a, b > 0.
This gives:
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p
0
(x) = −b < 0.
The technology for generation of black electricity is summarized in the cost function:
c (y) = 12y
2, with c
0
(y) = y > 0 and c
00
(y) = 1 ≥ 0.
The producers of green electricity have the following cost function:
h (z) = c2z
2 + gz, where c, g > 0, with h
0
(z) = cz + g > 0 and h
00
(z) = c ≥ 0.
Details of the numerical examples are not included in this paper, but may be obtained from
the authors upon request.
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